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Abstract:  
As resources of conventional oil and gas have dwindled, the international industry has responded through 
utilising a raft of techniques to access “unconventional” energy sources. The most controversial technique 
is hydraulic fracturing. This paper focuses on the regulation of hydraulic fracturing in New Zealand. 
Environmental concerns are outlined such as the high demand on water use, potential for groundwater 
contamination and deterrence of renewable energy investment. The current regulatory framework is found 
to devolve all responsibility for managing the environmental effects of hydraulic fracturing to local 
authorities. The relevance of the precautionary principle considered, finding that at present its utilisation is 
left to the discretion of the decision maker. This paper finds that lack of central government guidance has 
led to varying approaches to regulation across regions. The current regulation shows a lack of local 
government power and lack of appropriate remedies. Finally three options for reform are presented. 
Firstly, central government guidance through a National Policy Statement, National Environmental 
Standard or both. Secondly, transfer of consenting responsibility to a centralised body. Finally, declaration 
of a moratorium. New Zealand looks destined to experience a boom in hydraulic fracturing and this paper 
advocates for a tightening of regulation so that regulators stay ahead of the game.  
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I Introduction 
New Zealand is a country rich in an abundance of energy resources. Energy is an 
essential input to all sectors of the economy and the world has grown dependent on a 
range of energy sources to fuel the day-to-day life of modern society. As resources of 
conventional oil and gas have dwindled, the international industry has responded through 
utilising a raft of techniques to access “unconventional” energy sources. The most 
controversial of these techniques is hydraulic fracturing. Looking to New Zealand, there 
have been approximately 30 to 40 wells fracked in the Taranaki region since the 1990s. 
Now, the oil industry is on the brink of a large expansion. There has been an increase in 
land permitted for such uses, and large overseas oil companies are setting aside millions 
for capital expenditure.  
 
Similar expansions in other countries have left regulators scrambling to catch up. The 
range of regulatory responses to hydraulic fracturing that have occurred worldwide 
demonstrate that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. This technology has experienced 
rapid growth over the last decade and government reaction has been varied across the 
world. Many countries or states have called bans or moratoria on fracking including 
Germany, France, Ireland and more recently, Scotland and Wales. In Australia, fracking 
is prohibited in Victoria but New South Wales has recently lifted its moratorium, with 
restrictions.  
 
Hydraulic fracturing has become a matter of increasing public interest in the last decade 
and this paper seeks to provide an overview of the key issues in the New Zealand context 
as well as recommending options to improve the current regulatory regime.  
 
This paper will first outline the hydraulic fracturing process and associated environmental 
concerns. For example, environmental scientists are concerned about the potential for 
groundwater contamination from faulty wells and leaks. These incidents have led to 
underground sources of drinking water becoming contaminated across America due to a 
fast spreading industry which has been left largely unregulated. 
 
In the New Zealand context, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
(PCE), Dr Jan Wright, has issued two reports on fracking in New Zealand. An interim 
report was released in 2012. The Prime Minister has publically stated that this report gave 
fracking a tick of approval.1 This is not the case. The report did state that the 
  
1 Rob Maetzig “Key’s fracking speech angers Greens” Stuff.co.nz (online ed, New Zealand, 23 March 
2013). 
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environmental risks of fracking can be managed through regulation. However, Wright 
expressed significant concerns that the regulatory environment for fracking in our country 
is “fragmented and complicated”.2 
 
This paper then proceeds to outline the current regulatory framework that relates to 
hydraulic fracturing within New Zealand, covering the three main statutes involved in 
managing environmental effects. Fracking has no fit for purpose regulations in New 
Zealand. Instead consents for operations are assessed under the general environmental 
law framework. This paper assesses the ability of the current consenting framework to 
manage risk generally, and with reference to specific fracking risks. Special consideration 
is given to the precautionary principle as a tool to guide decision makers. The high level 
conclusion is that while the framework is, at face value, capable of dealing with fracking 
risk, local government is ill-equipped and lacking in power in the consenting process. It is 
concerning that public participation is curtailed through the use of non-notified 
consenting pathways and bundling of consents. 
 
This paper then assesses the remedies available in the case of adverse environmental 
effects. While the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) provides statutory remedies, 
alongside the potential for citizens to find avenues for relief at common law these 
remedies are considered inadequate. This is related to the obstacles to gaining relief at 
common law such as cost and evidential difficulties. Environmental bonds or enforced 
public liability insurance are considered as options to protect landowners and the 
community in the event of environmental damage. 
 
Finally, three options for regulatory reform are offered. Firstly, central government 
guidance is highly recommended most likely through a National Policy Statement or 
National Environmental Standard. Secondly, the option of removing consenting 
responsibility from local councils to a centralised body such as the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) is considered. Thirdly, the declaration of a moratorium is 
discussed. The Government’s intends to exploit the major economic opportunity of 
continuing demand for oil and gas. To ensure this exploitation does not result in 
irreversible environmental harm, consistent and robust regulation should be implemented. 
 
  
2 Jan Wright Evaluating the environmental impacts of fracking in New Zealand: An Interim Report 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, November 2012) at 74. 
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II Hydraulic Fracturing and Environmental Concerns 
This paper does not intend to provide a comprehensive analysis of the technical process 
and environmental issues associated with hydraulic fracturing but instead to provide 
context for the regulatory analysis that is to follow. 
A What is “Fracking”? 
Most oil and gas that has been extracted in New Zealand (known as “conventional” oil 
and gas) is found in reservoir rock that is “porous and permeable” and therefore easy to 
access.3 In rock formations that have low permeability, oil and gas is harder to extract. In 
order to economically access the unconventional resources, techniques beyond 
conventional vertical well drilling are needed. Unconventional resources are much more 
costly to extract and therefore require specialised technology to make development 
economically worthwhile.4 
 
Hydraulic fracturing is a controversial method of extraction for these natural oil and gas 
resources that are found within unconventional formations.5 Commonly referred to as 
“fracking”, the process involves a high-pressure injection of fluids consisting of water, 
sand and chemicals up to 4000 metres down into a well to artificially fracture rocks 
underground.6 This produces fissures in the rock strata, increasing the flow of oil and 
gas.7 Natural gas and oil escape through the fissures and are drawn back up the well to 
the surface, where the resources are processed and refined.  
 
Contrary to popular opinion, hydraulic fracturing is far from a new technique. The 
technique has been used commercially since the 1950s when it was introduced by 
Standard Oil to improve the flow of hydrocarbons.8 Fracking has a shorter history in 
New Zealand with the first known frack occurring in 1989 in Taranaki.9 New Zealand has 
  
3 Wright, above n 2, at 13. 
4 Jason Burwen and Jan Flegal Unconventional Gas Exploration & Production (American Energy 
Innovation Council, Case Studies on the Government’s Role in Energy Technology Innovation, March 
2013) at 1. 
5 Joanne Hawkins “Fracking: minding the gaps” (2015) 17 Env L Rev 8 at 9. 
6 Yangmay Downing “Hydraulic Fracturing and Protection in Law from Negative Effects in New Zealand” 
(2012) 16 NZJEL 243 at 244. 
7 Clarissa Bierstedt “What’s the Fracking Problem?: Hydraulic Fracturing, Silica Sand, and Issues of 
Regulation” 2015 (63) Drake L Rev 639 at 641. 
8 Carl Montgomery and Michael Smith “Hydraulic Fracturing: History of an Enduring Technology” (2010) 
J. Petro. Tech at 26. 
9 Wright, above n 2, at 27. 
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multiple basins with hydrocarbon potential, but the Ministry for the Environment (MFE) 
has only identified the Taranaki basin as currently producing.10 There have been less than 
100 fracking operations in New Zealand since the technology was first used here and 
almost all have occurred in Taranaki.11 
 
In recent years, the pace of hydraulic fracturing operations has drastically increased 
worldwide. This is due to developments that allow application of the basic fracking 
technique to release vast amounts of natural gas and oil from “porous, but relatively 
impermeable” rock layers deep underground.12 This has transformed the global oil and 
gas industry, most notably in the United States where unconventional extraction 
techniques allowed the United States to increase its estimated natural gas reserves by 75 
percent in the seven years between 2004 and 2011.13  
 
In New Zealand, there are three types of rocks containing hydrocarbons where fracking 
is, or could be, used to extract oil and gas.14 In the Taranaki region, sandstone with low 
permeability can be fracked. Most of the fracking that has taken place worldwide, and 
especially in the United States, has been to extract natural gas from shale rock. Drilling 
into shale is beginning to occur in the east of the North Island. Fracking will likely occur 
if this gas is to be extracted from the shale in a commercially viable manner.15 Lastly, 
coal seam gas has been extracted by fracking in the Waikato by Solid Energy. In 
Australia, most of the fracking to date has been to release coal seam gas from coal 
deposits.  
B Concerns Associated with Fracking 
The long term environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing are poorly studied, because 
the practice has expanded exponentially in recent times.16 This paper will attempt to 
canvas the predominant concerns that arise in the debate surrounding hydraulic 
fracturing. 
  
10 Ministry for the Environment Managing Environmental Effects of Onshore Petroleum Development 
Activities (Including Hydraulic Fracturing): Guidelines for Local Government (March 2014) at 3. 
11 Wright, above n 2, at 27. 
12 Amanda C. Leiter “Fracking, Federalism and Private Governance” (2015) 39 Harv Envtl LRev 107 at 
109. 
13 At 115. 
14 Jan Wright, Drilling for Oil and Gas in New Zealand: Environmental oversight and regulation 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, June 2014) at 13. 
15 At 13. 
16 Downing, above n 6. 
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1 Water Use and Contamination 
Fracking is an intensive process that requires large volumes of water. This use of water 
could place high demands on water in some areas of New Zealand in the future.17 The US 
EPA estimates fracking requires 20 million litres of freshwater per frack. This would 
likely result in competition for water use with agriculture, especially on the East Coast 
where there is already stress on water reserves.  
 
One of the prime concerns associated with the fracking process is the potential link 
between fracking fluid injection and water contamination.18 The threat is that fractures 
created by the high-pressure injection may extend into underground aquifers that would 
allow oil and gas and fracking fluids to “migrate” into surrounding rock and eventually 
into groundwater sources used for drinking supplies.19 
There are at least four ways in which fracking can cause ground water contamination:20 
First, during or after the fracturing itself, fracturing fluid might migrate…into water 
wells and aquifers; second, natural gas released or disturbed by fracturing might seep 
into water wells and aquifers...third, vibrations from drilling and fracturing might 
disturb contaminants lying at the bottom of a water well, mixing them into the well 
water; fourth, used fracturing fluid or waste products generated by the production of 
oil and gas, might be disposed of in ways that pollute well waters and aquifers.  
2 Fracking Fluids 
In New Zealand, the fracking fluids currently used have three key components which 
are:21 
• A proppant, such as sand to prop the cracks open; 
• A gelling substance to carry the sand into the cracks; and 
• A de-gelling substance to thin the gel to allow the fracking fluid to return to the 
surface while leaving the sand in the fractures. 
Some of the chemicals used in these fluids may be toxic to humans and the environment. 
The fracking fluids in New Zealand are usually made up of 97 percent water and 
  
17 Wright, above n 2, at 39. 
18 Hawkins, above n 5, at 10. 
19 Mark Zoback, Saya Kitasei and Brad Copithorne Addressing the Environmental Risks from Shale Gas 
Development (World Watch Institute, Briefing Paper 1, 2010) at 7. 
20 Thomas Merrill and David Schizer The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water 
Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy (2013) 98 Minn L Rev 145 at 158. 
21 Wright, above n 2, at 39. 
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3 percent chemicals.22 Each chemical that is used in the fracking process has a specific 
purpose and the make-up of any particular fracking fluid “can differ depending on the 
requirements of the planned job”.23 In Australia, the National Toxics Network said, of the 
chemicals used, that:24 
The ones we were able to identify concerned us because of their potential to cause 
significant damage to the environment and human health. Some are linked with 
cancer and birth defects, while others damage the hormone system of living things 
and affect aquatic species at very low levels. 
A large volume of fracking fluid is needed per frack. For example, the largest frack to 
date in Taranaki used over 2000 cubic metres of fluid, the equivalent to 70 full tankers.25  
 
From 2001-2005, diesel based fracking fluids were used in Taranaki. These fluids contain 
low levels of B-TEX compounds, which can have harmful effects on humans if 
introduced to water or soil.26 MFE guidelines state that “because of the risks associated 
with diesel-based hydraulic fracturing fluids, water-based fluids should be strongly 
preferred”.27 In Queensland, laws restrict the use of B-TEX chemicals in fracking. 
Because the levels of allowed B-TEX chemicals are so low, in practice these chemicals 
cannot be added to fracking fluids.28 In New Zealand, there is currently no regulation in 
place preventing an operator from deciding to use B-TEX compounds.  
 
The leading problem internationally in this area is that fracking fluids may be able to be 
protected as trade secrets.29 Push for regulation has lead to mandatory disclosure in over 
16 states in America since 2010.30 The public backlash against the secrecy of fracking 
fluids has even led to voluntary disclosure. In the United States, some companies have 
self-reported the chemicals used in their operations to FracFocus, an online resource 
  
22 Wright, above n 2, at 111. 
23 At 113. 
24 National Toxics Network “Call for moratorium as report finds fracking chemicals have never been tested 
for safety” (21 February 2011) <www.ntn.org.au>. 
25 Wright, above n 2, at 39. 
26 Ministry for the Environment Managing Environmental Effects of Onshore Petroleum Development 
Activities (Including Hydraulic Fracturing): Guidelines for Local Government (March 2014) at 28. 
27 At 28. 
28 Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (Queensland) “Fracking and B-TEX fact sheet” 
<www.eph.qld.gov.au>.  
29 Keith Hall “Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory Disclosure of Fracturing Water 
Composition” (2013) 49 Idaho L Rev 399 at 406.  
30 At 408. 
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containing information about fracking jobs in various areas. The site was created to 
provide the public access to reported chemicals used for hydraulic fracturing in their 
area.31 Fitzgerald sees this sort of resource as a “comfortable compromise” for operators 
as it allows information to be released to reduce public pressure but the voluntary level of 
disclosure recognises the operator view that a fracking fluid mix is proprietary 
information.32 Although the trade secrets issue hasn’t arisen in New Zealand, public 
disclosure of chemical mixes could lead to greater public awareness and less backlash. It 
may also aid in the social license issue discussed later.  
3 Seismic Activity 
A link with earthquakes has captured the public interest, perhaps more than any other 
environmental issue relating to fracking. The latest study in Oklahoma shows that 300 
million-year-old fault lines have been awakened and are capable of producing a 6.0 
magnitude quake.33 Geologists have known for 50 years that fluid injection of waste 
water can increase pressure on seismic faults, leading to induced quakes.34 Fluid injection 
changes pressures underground and triggers dormant faults. In February, the United 
States Geological Survey definitively acknowledged that “the increased seismicity is due 
to fluid injection associated with new technologies that enable the extraction of oil and 
from previously unproductive reservoirs”.35  
 
Fracking advocates point to 23 years of fracking in the Taranaki region without incident. 
A GNS report in 2012 found no evidence of fracking having an observable effect on 
natural earthquakes in the region.36 However, different regions have different physical 
characteristics that lead to different risk factors. The Hawke’s Bay has been highlighted 
as the next area for fracking.37 Being a region with major known earthquake faults may 
mean that wells are more vulnerable to damage from seismic activity or this activity may 
be exacerbated. 
  
31 FracFocus <www.fracfocus.org>. 
32 Timothy Fitzgerald “Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing” (2013) 63 Case Western 
Reserve Law Review 1337 at 1355. 
33 Jon Herskovitz “Reactivated fault lines in Oklahoma could cause major quake: study” (17 March 2015) 
Reuters <www.reuters.com>. 
34 William Ellsworth “Injection-Induced Earthquakes” (12 July 2013) Science <www.sciencemag.org>. 
35 Susan Garcia and Leslie Gordon “Coping with Earthquakes Induced by Fluid Injection” (19 March 2015) 
U.S. Geological Survey <www.usgs.gov>.  
36 Steven Sherburn and Rosemary Quinn An Assessment of the Effects of Hydraulic Fracturing on 
Seismicity in the Taranaki Region (GNS Science Consultancy Report, 2012/50, February 2012). 
37 Wright, above n 2, at 5. 
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4 Disposal of Wastewater  
When the pressure is released after a frack has occurred, the flow back period begins. 
During this period, some of the fracking fluid returns to the surface. It is mixed with 
saline water and dissolved minerals from the rock formation (formation water) and 
together this is the wastewater.38 Disposing of the waste is a cause for concern because it 
generally contains a number of contaminants: 39 
These include the chemicals in the fracking fluid, natural gas, solids and radioactive 
components released in the fracking process, and proppants and gels that make up 
the fracking fluid; it is highly saline as well (due to mixing with underground saline 
water). 
Two main methods are used in Taranaki to dispose of this type of waste. The first is deep 
well injection. This has been the approach used most commonly in the United States. 
Deep injection of wastewater could cause groundwater contamination through migration 
into aquifers, in the same way that fracking fluid could.40 There is also a risk that deep 
well injection could trigger earthquakes, including larger tremors than those caused by 
fracking because a greater volume of fluid is injected over a longer period of time. Keene 
argues that this concern holds more weight in New Zealand where there are already 
heightened seismic risks.41 Our unique geology could raise additional risks of an 
earthquake dislodging injected wastewater causing contaminating groundwater.  
 
The other main technique used is known as landfarming. This involves spreading the 
fracking waste over large portions of land. Landfarming is a form of bioremediation, 
which allows the bacteria in soil to break down waste constituents (particularly 
hydrocarbons, other organic compounds and nitrogen).42 This justification does not 
address other pollutants in the waste that could contaminate the soil.43 
The main legislation that applies to the disposal of waste water in New Zealand is the 
Resource Management Act 1992 (RMA) which leaves the regulation to consenting 
authorities:44 
  
38 Keene, above n 38, at 28. 
39 At 28. 
40 Wright, above n 2, at 47. 
41 Keene, above n 38, at 28. 
42 Mary Beth Adams “Land Application of Hydrofracturing Fluids Damages a Deciduous Forest Stand in 
West Virginia” (2011) 40 Journal of Environmental Quality 1340. 
43 Keene, above n 38, at 28. 
44 At 28. 
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A resource consent is required for land or water-based disposal of wastewater, unless 
there is a National Environmental Standard or rule in a regional plan permitting the 
activity, or unless the wastewater is treated to remove the contaminants. 
Later this paper advocates that the issue of disposal of wastewater is a problem that 
would be best regulated by a National Environmental Standard. This would ensure a 
consistent and appropriate response is applied across regions by limiting discretion of 
consenting authorities and providing high-level guidance. Pennsylvania provides the best 
example of a response to this problem by requiring private treatment of waste water 
before disposal. This shifts the onus onto companies to ensure they implement adequate 
disposal measures.45  
5 Lack of Renewable Energy Development 
Natural gas is often touted as a “transition fuel” in the movement towards low-carbon 
energy use to mitigate climate change.46 Environmentalists argue that the short-term 
economic gains associated with fracking are distracting the sense of urgency from 
transitioning to renewable energy such as wind or solar power.47 The International 
Energy Agency has warned that the rapid increase of unconventional gas extraction 
(expected to triple by 2035) will stop investment in renewable energy if governments do 
not take action.48  
 
The burning of natural gas has a lesser toll on the environment than the burning of oil and 
coal.49 However, the level of methane that is released during fracking is concerning. 
Studies carried out in the United States show that three percent or more of natural 
methane gas extracted through fracking can escape during the process.50 Although 
methane does not remain in the atmosphere for as long as carbon dioxide (9 to 15 years 
compared to 50 to 100 years), it still has a potent effect on the environment and is 
especially damaging in the short term.51  
  
45 At 29. 
46 Eleanor Stephenson, Alexander Doukas and Karena Shaw “Greenwashing gas: might a ‘transition fuel’ 
label legitimize carbon-intensive natural gas development” (2012) 46 Energy Policy 452 at 452. 
47 Andrew Groom “How and when can Australia go 100% renewable” (2014) 32 Energy News 16 at 18. 
48 Fiona Harvey “'Golden age of gas' threatens renewable energy, IEA warns” The Guardian (online ed, 
United Kingdom, 29 May 2012). 
49 Economist “Natural Gas: Cleaner, not Cooler” (6 August 2011) <www.economist.com>. 
50 Jeff Tollefson “Methane leaks erode green credentials of natural gas” (2 January 2013) Nature 
<www.nature.com>. 
51 Environmental Protection Agency “Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Carbon Dioxide Emissions” and 
“Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Methane Emissions” <www.epa.gov>.  
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III Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment Reports 
The PCE has commented that New Zealand is “poised on the brink of what could be a 
large and rapid expansion of oil and gas production”.52 In March 2012, the PCE 
announced an investigation on fracking in New Zealand, in response to requests from 
both sides of the House, councils and members of the public.53 The high level conclusion 
from this report was that the environmental risks associated with fracking can be 
managed effectively if operational best practices are implemented and enforced through 
regulation.54  
 
However, the PCE was not confident that such best practices were being enforced. The 
investigation entered a second phase to consider the monitoring and regulation of 
fracking in New Zealand. It is also unclear what exactly the “operational best practices 
are” and if these are accepted or agreed by both regulators and players in the industry. 
The phrase was borrowed from a Royal Society review of hydraulic fracturing in the 
United Kingdom.55 
 
The second report Drilling for Oil and Gas in New Zealand: Environmental oversight 
and regulation was released in June 2014 and found the government regulation to be 
inadequate, “even without the potential for rapid growth” in the industry.56 Extensive 
reform of New Zealand’s laws, agencies and processes was not judged to be required, but 
due to the potential for rapid expansion there was a call for changes. The then Minister 
for the Environment Amy Adams and Minister of Energy and Resources Simon Bridges 
welcomed the report but stated that MFE guidelines,57 released prior to the second PCE 
report, were sufficient to encourage “best practice” and provide “clear direction so that 
hydraulic fracturing is carried out in a robust, controlled and well regulated manner”.58 
These government guidelines, discussed later, were criticised by the Commissioner for 
“containing a great deal of information” but doing little more than describe current 
industry management in Taranaki.59  
  
52 Wright, above n 2, at 69. 
53 At 5. 
54 At 5. 
55 The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering Shale gas extraction in the UK: a review of 
hydraulic fracturing (June 2012). 
56 Wright, above n 14. 
57 Ministry for the Environment, above n 10, at 28. 
58 Amy Adams and Simon Bridges “Ministers welcome final PCE report on oil and gas” (press release, 4 
June 2014). 
59 Wright, above n 14, at 5. 
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The last chapter of the report consists of six recommendations for improvements to the 
regulatory framework:60 
1. Government provision of national direction through a National Policy 
Statement, paying particular attention to unconventional oil and gas; 
2. Revision of regional council plans – propose revised rules for the oil and gas 
industry; 
3. Ensure that wells have ‘integrity’ for protection of workers and the 
environment; 
4. Require companies to hold public liability insurance and set up a liability 
regime; 
5. Amend legislation (or regulations) so that regional councils are legally 
responsible for enforcing the provisions of HSNO on oil and gas work sites; 
6. Convene a working group to consider how solid waste from oil and gas 
wells in the East Coast basin should be disposed of before wells begin to 
proliferate. 
 
IV The Current Regulatory Framework 
Minister Bridges claims that the government has built a “world-class regulatory 
framework” to ensure that any oil and gas development occurs in an environmentally 
responsible and safe way.61 However, this paper supports the PCE view that current 
government oversight and regulation of the industry is complex and fragmented.62 This 
paper will now outline the current framework through discussion of the core statutes 
involved in the regulation of fracking operations.  
A Crown Minerals Act 1991 
Ownership of petroleum is vested in the Crown.63 The allocation and access of Crown-
owned minerals is governed by the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (CMA), while 
environmental regulation of development occurs under the RMA.64 These two statutes, 
by separating the allocation of rights to minerals and the environmental regulation of 
activities, significantly changed the previous statutory regime.65 
  
60 At 73-82. 
61 New Zealand Government “Oil and Gas Block Offer 2015 announced” (press release, 30 March 2015). 
62 Wright, above n 2, at 76. 
63 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 10. 
64 Downing, above n 6, at 262. 
65 Michelle Van Kampen “The Adequacy of Legislation Regulating the Environmental Effects of Mining” 
(2012) 16 NZELJ 203 at 218. 
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Before a company can consider drilling a fracking well, it must obtain a permit under the 
CMA from New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals who manage the Government’s crown 
minerals estate. The purpose of the CMA was amended in 2013 to record the 
Government’s desire to “promote prospecting for, exploration for, and mining of Crown 
owned minerals for the benefit of New Zealand”.66 The Minerals Programme for 
Petroleum, which defines how the CMA is administered and applied, provides that:67 
The Minister considers that, within the context and mandate of the Act, “the benefit 
of New Zealand” is best achieved by increasing New Zealand’s economic wealth 
through maximising the economic recovery of New Zealand’s petroleum resources. 
Companies obtain permits to explore for oil and gas through the annual Block Offer 
process.68 The Petroleum Block Offer is an annual tender used to allocate petroleum 
exploration permits. The 2015 Annual Tender for oil and gas exploration permits was 
launched on 30th March by Minister Bridges.69 
 
At this stage, New Zealand Petroleum & Minerals will assess the technical and financial 
capability of the bidder, and undertake a high-level assessment of an operator’s capability 
to comply with applicable health, safety and environmental legislation.70 Once a permit is 
granted, the holder has an exclusive right to the oil and gas under the ground covered by 
the permit for a set time period. Permits granted in Block Offer 2015 will be granted for 
10 to 15 years.71 An exploration permit gives the permit holder the rights to search for 
commercially recoverable reserves of oil and gas in a specific area.72 
 
A permit to prospect, explore or mine does not give a right of access to land – an access 
arrangement must be arranged.73 However, as private landowners do not own the oil and 
gas under their land, they cannot outright prevent a permit holding company from drilling 
on their land. If an agreement cannot be reached between the company and the landowner 
  
66 Section 1A.  
67 New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals Petroleum Programme (Minerals Programme for Petroleum 2013) 
(24 May 2013) at 6. 
68 Prior to 2012, petroleum exploration permits were allocated on a first-come, first-served approach where 
the government had little influence over when or where companies applied for petroleum exploration 
permits. 
69 New Zealand Government “Oil and Gas Block Offer 2015 announced” (press release, 30 March 2015). 
70 New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals Guide to Government Management of Petroleum (June 2014) at 2. 
71 At 6. 
72 At 7. 
73 Section 47. 
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then an arbitrator can be appointed and mandatory arbitration imposed.74 If an 
exploratory well indicates that commercial quantities of oil and gas can be extracted, the 
company can then apply for a petroleum mining permit as long as this application is made 
before the exploration permit expires. 
 
B Resource Management Act 1991 
Hydraulic fracturing activities are predominantly regulated under the RMA. The RMA is 
New Zealand’s primary statute setting out the management of the environment and 
natural resources, particularly focusing on how the effects of activities should be 
managed. An application to undertake hydraulic fracturing must comply with the RMA’s 
requirements. All resource consents granted under the RMA must be consistent with its 
general purpose: to “promote the sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources”.75 Controls can be set by local authority decision makers in two broad ways 
under the RMA.  
 
Firstly through planning considerations, such as policies and rules in regional and district 
plans. Regional Policy Statements are made to provide:76 
An overview of the resource management issues of the region and policies and 
methods to achieve integrated management of the natural and physical resources of 
the whole region. 
Regional councils also prepare plans which set out rules as to how activities are 
classified.77 To use drilling as an example: in most district and regional plans, drilling 
(whether for oil and gas or water) is a permitted or controlled activity and therefore will 
always be allowed, but be subject to conditions.78 Consents are required when an activity 
is discretionary in the plan.79 In the Gisborne region, drilling for oil and gas is a 
discretionary activity.80 Drilling (as an example) shows that there is little consistency in 
the way regional plans are written and further variation can exist within regions at the 
district council level. Another activity requiring consent is injecting fracking fluid into a 
  
74 Section 66. 
75 Resource Management Act 1991, s 5. 
76 Section 59. 
77 Sections 63 and 67(1). 
78 Wright, above n 2, at 56. 
79 Section 104B. 
80 Wright, above n 14, at 21. 
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well as this is considered to be a “discharge” for the purposes of the RMA.81 No regional 
council plans currently allow fracking as a permitted activity or classify it as its own 
distinct activity.82 After fracking has been carried out and production has ended the well 
will be abandoned. Councils generally have their own provisions for well abandonment 
and site restoration, but the nature of these provisions can vary widely. In Waikato there 
is a very broad single objective for well disposal whereas Gisborne has a very 
prescriptive provision. 
 
The second way a regional or district council can control hydraulic fracturing is through 
conditions in resource consents (if and when these consents are granted). As outlined 
above, whether consenting is required for an activity will depend on how that activity is 
classified.83 If an activity is classified as permitted, it will not require a resource 
consent.84 A resource consent is required when a particular activity is not described as 
permitted by the Act, a regulation or a regional or district plan.85 A local authority has to 
grant a resource consent for a controlled activity, with some exceptions, but can refuse to 
grant a resource consent for a restricted discretionary, discretionary or non-complying 
activity.86 In applying for resource consents, companies need to demonstrate how they 
will manage the effects on the environment.87 Companies may apply for all consents 
required for establishing a well site together, or they can be ‘unbundled’ and applied for 
separately. There are mixed views on unbundling. Some see this approach as a good way 
to stage a development but others think it prevents consideration of the whole operation 
and denies public participation. Concerns regarding lack of public participation in the 
regulation of fracking are discussed later. 
 
C Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 
Any chemicals used in the fracking process that are considered hazardous need to be 
approved by the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA). The Hazardous Substances 
and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO Act) sets out obligations for handling, use, storage 
and implementing spill contingency plans for fracking fluids. The purpose of these 
requirements is to avoid or minimise risks to human health and the environment 
  
81 Section 15. 
82 Wright, above n 2, at 58. 
83 Section 87A.  
84 Section 87A(1).  
85 Section 87A. 
86 Section 87A.  
87 Section 104(1)(a). 
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associated with the storage or use of hazardous substances,88 including chemicals used in 
fracking at well sites. 
 
In New Zealand, most substances used in fracking fluid are classed as hazardous under 
the HSNO Act.89 The operator of a well site that uses hazardous substances while 
fracking must ensure compliance with a wide range of HSNO Act requirements including 
maintaining a register of hazardous chemicals stored on side and separating storage 
tanks.90 Currently, any hazardous substances that might be used in fracking do not require 
specific EPA approval for use for this purpose. Rather than circumventing HSNO 
controls altogether, the operators apply for the fluids under a group standard. A group 
standard is an approval for a group of hazardous substances of a similar nature, type or 
use.91 EPA states that a group standard sets out the conditions that enable a group of 
hazardous substances to be managed safely.92 
 
Climate Justice Taranaki has alleged that the EPA “admitted in April 2012 that the 
majority of fracking chemicals were self-assessed by companies and approved under the 
group standard “additives, process chemicals and raw materials”.93 This group standard is 
for products that are used in the manufacture or processing of other products.94  
 
The EPA, in reply to Climate Justice Taranaki, has stated:95  
Currently we do not have any controls that relate to the use of a substance in a 
hydraulic fracturing activity as, to date, we have not processed a Part 5 application 
for a substance where fracking was the sole proposed use (or mentioned in the 
application as a possible use). … The other mode of approval primarily for mixtures 
is via a ‘group standard’. .. a ‘blanket’ approval for a group of substances ... This is 
how the majority of the hydraulic fracturing substances are said to be approved. The 
  
88 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, s 4. 
89 Wright, above n 2, at 115. 
90 Submission of Taranaki Regional Council to Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment on the 
Future Regulation of Fracking (Taranaki Regional Council, 9 October 2013). 
91 Environmental Protection Authority “Group standards” <www.epa.govt.nz>. 
92 Environmental Protection Authority, above n 91. 
93 Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment Investigation into Hydraulic Fracturing in New 
Zealand: Second Submissions by Climate Justice Taranaki (Climate Justice Taranaki, 12 August 2013) at 6. 
94 Environmental Protection Authority, above n 91. 
95 Climate Justice Taranaki Submission to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment’s 
Investigation into Hydraulic Fracturing in New Zealand (Climate Justice Taranaki, 12 November 2012) at 
3. 
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relevant group standard is the ‘Additives, process chemicals and raw materials group 
standards’ … It is up to the importer to determine if the substance is approved via a 
group standard 
Councils can consider the use of chemicals in the resource consent process but the PCE 
report concluded that “it is largely up to councils to consider the environmental risks of 
using particular chemicals in fracking fluid. It is not clear whether councils are relying on 
generic HSNO Act approvals rather than assessing the environmental risk of the 
chemicals used at each particular site”.96 This concern is further discussed later, in the 
context of the precautionary principle.  
 
V Risk and Regulation 
The regulatory issue can also be framed as: are risks inherent in the fracking process 
properly characterised and regulated for? The control of undesirable risk is a central 
justification for regulation.97 It is a role of a regulator to develop intervention strategies 
designed to influence commercial operators in managing or reducing risks to social and 
environmental values.98 Human activities associated with advancing interests for 
economic gain will often introduce risks to social and environmental values. 
 
Over recent decades, there has been an increasing focus among policymakers towards 
setting risk management as a focus of regulation. The term risk-based regulation covers a 
very broad range of approaches.99 A risk-based approach to regulation provides a 
framework that will enable regulators to justify decisions around regulatory interventions 
and ensure responses are proportionate to the nature of the risk.100 Environmental law and 
regulating for risk go hand in hand as the law seeks to balance individual and corporate 
freedoms with the perceived public good in environmental protection.101 
 
  
96 Wright, above n 2, at 58. 
97 Bridget Hutter The Attractions of Risk-based Regulation: accounting for the emergence of risk ideas in 
regulation (ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, Discussion Paper No 33, March 2005) at 3. 
98 Alastair R. Lucas, Theresa Watson and Eric Kimmel “Regulating Multistage Hydraulic Fracturing” in 
Donald N. Zillman and others “The Law of Energy Underground: Understanding New Developments in 
Subsurface Production, Transmission, and Storage” (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 133. 
99 Hutter, above n 97, at 3. 
100 Lucas, Watson and Kimmel, above n 98, at 133. 
101 S.W. Christensen and W.D. Jennings “Legal Issues relating to Environmental Risk Management” (paper 
presented to the Advantage New Zealand Petroleum Summit, 2013) at 1.  
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Risks are exacerbated where the industry is left to ‘self-regulate’. The PCE identified that 
in New Zealand, companies appear to be not only regulating themselves, but monitoring 
their own performance.102 Companies, through the consenting process, are relied upon to 
submit large amounts of technical information to local government consenting 
authorities, New Zealand Petroleum & Minerals and to the EPA who may be ill-equipped 
to evaluate the accuracy of this information.103 This impairs their ability to ensure that 
regulatory responses are proportionate to the nature of the risk. 
 
The definition of risk can take many forms and is disputed among academics. The term 
risk is commonly used to refer to situations involving an element of “chance”.104 
However, the term also incorporates the concepts of ‘harm’, and ‘threat’.105 The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines the term “risk” as a chance or possibility of danger, loss, 
injury or other adverse consequences. For the purposes of this paper, the term risk is used 
in this basic sense. Risk can never be completely eliminated, all decisions involve an 
element of risk and even deferring a decision can involve risk.  
 
This paper now seeks to assess how risk is managed under the RMA. Risk management 
involves:106 
Establishing where a risk falls in terms of likelihood and impact and then developing 
an organisational strategy to manage the risk. It is a systematic approach to setting 
the best course of action under uncertainty by identifying, assessing, understanding, 
acting on and communicating risk issues. 
 
A The Resource Management Act and Risk 
Under New Zealand law, the power imbalance between non-monetary societal interests 
and the industry interests are addressed by legislation such as the RMA.107 The 
framework can be described as effects-based. It regulates the effects of activities rather 
than the activities themselves. Every application for a resource consent requires an 
applicant to provide an Assessment of Environmental Effects.108 This term is used to 
  
102 Wright, above n 2, at 77. 
103 At 77. 
104 Alan Randall Risk and Precaution (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) at 31. 
105 At 31. 
106 Linda Cameron “Environmental Risk Management in New Zealand – Is There Scope to Apply A More 
Generic Framework?” (New Zealand Treasury Policy Perspectives Paper 06/06, July 2006) at 6. 
107 Christensen and Jennings, above n 101, at 1. 
108 Section 88(2)(b).  
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describe the assessment of positive and negative effects on the environment.109 The RMA 
provides for public notification and participation where effects are classified as “more 
than minor”.110 
 
In deciding whether or not to grant resource consents, s 104 requires consent authorities 
to have regard to “any actual and potential effects on the environment of allowing the 
activity”.111 The term “effect” is defined very widely in the RMA, and includes:112 
(a) any positive or adverse effect; and 
(b) any temporary or permanent effect; and 
(c) any past, present, or future effect; and 
(d) any cumulative effect which arises over time or in combination with other 
effects— 
regardless of the scale, intensity, duration, or frequency of the effect, and also 
includes— 
(e) any potential effect of high probability; and 
(f) any potential effect of low probability which has a high potential impact. 
This wide definition implicitly includes risk by referring to potential effects of high 
probability113 and any potential effects of low probability with a high potential impact.114 
The Environment Court in Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council noted that 
through this definition, Parliament may have intended the decision maker to consider two 
different types of risk:115 
The first is a risk based on scientific fact (a fact that can be proven beyond 50% or 
even higher but never absolutely). The second is a risk where there is a plausible (but 
with no scientific certainty to back it up) chance that an effect may occur. 
This shows that potential risks are not beyond the scope of the RMA. The standard of 
proof that applies to predictions about the future will necessarily differ from the standard 
of proof traditionally applied to fact finding about events that have occurred 
  
109 Vernon Rive “Environmental Assessment” in Derek Nolan (ed) Environmental and Resource 
Management Law (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at 1168. 
110 Sections 95-95G.  
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113 Section 101(1)(e). 
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115 [1999] NZRMA 66 (EnvC) at [116]. 
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previously.116 In fact, in 2008 the Environment Court concluded that there is no standard 
of proof for “future events”.117 A decision maker is required to make an assessment of the 
probabilities of the future events (even if lower than 50 percent) and then consider costs 
and benefits to assess the risk.118  
 
There is no burden of proof placed on any party to a resource consent application. 
However, sufficient evidence must be provided to give the decision maker the ability to 
make a judgement:119 
Each party must provide enough evidence to prove that the risk (if there is one) is 
either acceptable or not acceptable in the circumstances (i.e. proving a negative) to 
the decision maker. In environmental decisions this generally starts with the 
applicant. As the evidence mounts the burden will shift between parties eventually 
resting with the party that will fail without further evidence. 
This paper submits that this all shows that the framework of the RMA is not ill-equipped 
or unable to deal with risk. At a purely structural level, there is a solid framework in place 
for the provision of information about a wide range of environmental effects as well as 
scope for consideration of potential effects (i.e. risks) in the decision-making process. 
However, as discussed later the implementation of regulation by local government who 
are ill-prepared to manage fracking operations means that risk is not managed adequately. 
B  Precautionary Principle 
Fracking appears to have the potential to create “diffuse, widespread, and damaging 
environmental impacts for which liability will be difficult to assign”.120 This has led 
some academics to propose that the ideal regulatory theory to deal with the activity will 
be a theory that utilises the “precautionary principle”.121 Where there are difficulties in 
ascertaining the risk of future adverse impacts on the environment, there is often 
  
116 Christensen and Jennings, above n 101, at 8. 
117 Long Bay Okura Great Park Society Inc. v North Shore City Council NZEnvC A078/08. 
118 At [321]. 
119 Christensen and Jennings, above n 101, at 9. 
120 Robert Holahan and Gwen Arnold “An institutional theory of hydraulic fracturing policy” (2013) 94 
Ecological Economics 127 at 132. 
121 For example, see: Holahan and Arnold, above n 120, at 132; Downing, above n 6, at 255; Madelon 
Finkel and Adam Law “The Rush to Drill for Natural Gas: A Public Health Cautionary Tale” (2011) 101 
Am J Public Health 784 at 785; Zachary Lees “Anticipated Harm, Precautionary Regulation and Hydraulic 
Fracturing” (2012) 13 VtJEnvtlL 575 at 605; Sara Phillips and Mark Goldberg “Natural gas development: 
extracting externalities - towards precaution-based decision-making” (2013) 9 McGill Int'l J Sust Dev L & 
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reference to the precautionary principle as a basis for resource management 
decision-making.122 The concept assumes that science does not always provide the 
insights needed to protect the environment in an effective manner.123 Over recent times, 
precaution has become “indispensable” as a legal tool to manage risk.124 The 
precautionary principle is especially relevant to fracking as the development and spread 
of the technique outpaces our understanding of its effects.125  
 
The most recognised and cited international formulation of the principle is included in 
Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development:126 
In order to protect the environment the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious of 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
The principle is a formulation of the classic notion that it is “better to be safe than 
sorry”.127 Under the precautionary principle, a lack of absolute certainty as to the 
negative effects of an activity should not prevent action from being taken to prevent or 
mitigate these effects.128 Lees describes the principle as having the beauty of a two-fold 
approach:129 
First, it justifies regulation before full scientific certainty can be established (and 
before permanent environmental damage occurs), and second, it enables legislators 
to shift the burden of proof from the traditional structure that requires regulators 
prove that regulation is necessary to requiring that the industry prove that regulation 
is unnecessary. 
  
122 Claire Kirman and Justice Christian Whata “Environmental litigation and dispute resolution” in Derek 
Nolan (ed) Environmental and Resource Management Law (5th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at 1271. 
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the Resource Management Act” (2014) 26 NZULR 376 at 376. 
125 Lees, above n 121, at 584. 
126 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration, June 14 1992, UN Doc 
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127 Alexander Gillespie “Precautionary New Zealand” (2011) 24 NZULR 364 at 365. 
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This can be seen as an articulation of the precautionary principle in its strongest form. In 
this form, the principle is acting to reverse the burden of proof. That is, regulators should 
place the burden on fracking operators to show their processes are safe before being 
allowed to proceed. The flexibility of the precautionary principle is a double edged 
sword; it allows its application to an array of environmental and health issues but its 
generality means it lends little guidance to shape policy. Gillespie emphasises that “any 
measures adopted under the precautionary principle are of a transitory nature and may be 
eclipsed when a greater scientific evidence is ascertainable”.130 Therefore, if scientific 
evidence can conclusively suggest no harm will occur out of an operation, the measures 
adopted can be reversed.  
 
A leading Australian opponent of fracking, Drew Hutton, has accused the oil and gas 
sector and government in his country of using a “suck it and see approach” that “throws 
the precautionary principle” out of the window.131 US academics have questioned 
whether the precautionary principle seems to have missed its chance at halting the gas 
rush until more is known of its effects.132 As parts of New Zealand are yet to be exploited 
through fracking, we still have the opportunity to take a precautious approach. 
 
New Zealand’s environmental law has made no general declaration to adopt the 
precautionary principle, but it is already at play throughout environmental regulation 
including, to varying extents, within the legislation currently regulating oil and gas 
production. Although there is no direct reference to precaution in the RMA it is implicit 
in the way the Act is implemented.133 The RMA is equipped to deal with the application 
of the precautionary principle, but the application is largely left to the discretion of the 
decision maker. It seems that the RMA is not able to apply the precautionary principle in 
a strong manner specifically towards fracking. Nolan states that “the adoption of the 
precautionary principle within the RMA…can be seen in the need to have regard to the 
potential effects of activities on the environment”.134 Shirley Primary School v 
Christchurch City Council held that the precautionary approach was inherent in the RMA 
and that to apply the principle separately would lead to double-counting of the need for 
caution.135 Every application for a resource consent requires an applicant to provide an 
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Assessment of Environmental Effects, but the precautionary principle is utilised as part of 
the overall broad judgement instead of expressly incorporated. 
 
As discussed earlier, another issue with regards to the precautionary principle is that there 
is no burden of proof for resource consent applications. This could not necessarily be 
solved easily. If you were to reverse the burden of proof for fracking operations this 
would likely raise complicated issues of evidence. For example, how safe is safe and who 
will decide? Operators’ definition of safe could be very different from what the regulators 
or the public see as being safe.136 Most of the critiques of the precautionary principle 
focus on the issue of what level of proof is sufficient for both “triggering pre-emptive 
actions as well as demonstrating that an activity is safe”.137 It is likely to be politically 
unacceptable to require industry operators to prove to a high standard that their operations 
are risk free as this would raise costs of production and deter investment in the oil and gas 
sector in New Zealand.  
 
This paper argues that there is scope within the current framework to employ the 
precautionary principle in consenting decisions but leaving it as part of the overall broad 
judgement approach relies on the decision maker’s discretion. Peterson argues that 
allowing decision makers this high level of discretion as to when and how to apply the 
precautionary principle may lead to “unpredictable and inconsistent environmental 
management decisions”.138 This is also a disadvantage for industry as lack of clarity does 
not provide clear guidance for business decisions and opens the door for the appeal of 
decisions. This paper claims that if the precautionary principle is judged to be required in 
deciding whether to grant consents for fracking, clearer guidance should be given in a 
National Policy Statement. This would have to be incorporated into local authority plans 
and rules and therefore considered by all decision makers.139 
 
Even where the need for precaution is directly laid out in the relevant statute, it can be 
avoided. A good example is the regulation of fracking fluids. Most of the chemicals used 
in fracking fluids are classified as hazardous substances under the HSNO Act.  
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Section 7 states: 
Precautionary approach 
All persons exercising functions, powers, and duties under this Act, including but not 
limited to, functions, powers, and duties under sections 28A, 29, 32, 38, 45, and 48, 
shall take into account the need for caution in managing adverse effects where there 
is scientific and technical uncertainty about those effects. 
This section has been regarded as akin to the precautionary principle by emphasising the 
need for caution in managing adverse effects “where there is scientific and technical 
uncertainty about those effects”.140 It shows a clear legislative attempt to place a high 
value on precaution.141 However, critics believe that this legislation is “far from adequate 
in protecting the environment from fracking impacts”.142 This paper earlier discussed 
how importers can self-assess and bring in hazardous substances under the “additives, 
process chemicals and raw materials” group standard umbrella. As of April 2012, the 
EPA had not processed a single application for a substance where fracking was 
mentioned as a possible use rather than under a group standard.143  
 
There is scope within the resource consent process for fracking operations under the 
RMA to require disclosure of all fracking compounds intended for use, as part of the 
consent application.144 However, the PCE report concluded that “it is largely up to 
councils to consider the environmental risks of using particular chemicals in fracking 
fluid. It is not clear whether councils are relying on generic HSNO approvals rather than 
assessing the environmental risk of the chemicals used at each particular site”.145 This is 
concerning. In addition, the HSNO Act provides that RMA instruments can only include 
more stringent requirements than the HSNO Act when they are considered necessary for 
the purposes of the RMA.146 When the HSNO Act requirements are sufficient to meet the 
purposes of the RMA that test will not be met. Here we are seeing a careless approach 
where the regime allows group standards to be used for fracking fluids. This shifts the 
responsibility of considering environmental risks from the central regulator with industry 
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expertise to the local authority, despite a statutory requirement to use caution where there 
is scientific uncertainty about effects. 
 
Later in this paper, the option of shifting the responsibility of consenting fracking 
operations to a centralised body (the EPA) is discussed. The EPA currently makes 
decisions for marine consents under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (EEZ Act), guided by information principles. The 
principles are set out in s 61 and include a requirement for the EPA to favour caution and 
environmental protection when information available is uncertain or inadequate.147 There 
is no equivalent to these information principles in the RMA. Section 61 is directive, in 
contrast to the RMA’s overall broad judgement approach. If consenting for hydraulic 
fracturing was considered by the EPA decision-making committee, taking into account 
the directive information principles, then precaution more prevalent in the decision of 
whether or not to allow a project. The EPA’s method of making decisions under 
information principles seems to be a more effective way to explicitly apply the 
precautionary principle to fracking. This is more desirable than leaving the precautionary 
principle as a mere discretionary consideration under the overall broad judgement of the 
decision maker under the RMA.  
 
VI Analysis of Current Regulation 
From a practical viewpoint, the current regulatory regime is by no means satisfactory. 
Within New Zealand’s current legal and environmental regulatory framework, it is 
understandable that fracking activities are primarily regulated under the RMA. The RMA 
is our main statute setting out the management of the environment and natural resources, 
particularly focusing on how the environmental effects of our activities should be 
managed. 
 
This paper has assessed the RMA as having broad scope to consider risks in consenting 
decisions due to the wide definition of “effect”.148 However, this paper argues that the 
existing scheme is not adequate to deal with the specific environmental issues raised by 
fracking. No risks are certain, so the key issue for regulators is managing the likelihood 
of risk. The controversy around fracking worldwide has led many countries to simply ban 
the practice. This shows that for some, the likelihood or potential risk is above an 
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acceptable level. Because there is often a time delay before the appearance of 
environmental damage it is not yet known whether fracking has occurred elsewhere 
without environmental consequences. However, evidence has already arisen of immediate 
detrimental effects as discussed earlier in this paper. 
 
The lack of a fit for purpose regulatory regime exacerbates the likelihood of risks 
occurring. The RMA is not well suited to managing cumulative effects or expanding 
technologies– the PCE has framed the issue as: “the straw that breaks the camel’s back 
generally receives consent more readily than the first straw”.149 Another issue with the 
RMA is that although a project can be given consent subject to conditions after an effects 
assessment, there is no continuous regulatory control after this point:150 
Overall, one sees that the grant of a resource consent subject to conditions is an 
event that comes to final conclusion, subject only to monitoring of compliance and 
to formal review procedures. The RMA is not arranged in a manner that allows on-
going responsive regulatory action over an extended period.  
This paper will now outline issues with the current regulatory process. 
A Lack of Local Government Power 
Due to the lack of a specific fracking regulatory regime, most regional plans do not have 
specific rules that deal with discharges of hydraulic fracking fluids separately from other 
discharges.151 Therefore, fracking is dealt with in the same way as many other activities 
under the RMA. This means that a council has limited discretion in how it can deal with 
an application involving fracking. Regional councils (as consent authorities) are legally 
obligated to consider any consent application on its merits – and refusal to do so may 
invite either judicial review or appeal proceedings.152 In many cases the individual 
activities that are undertaken as part of an oil exploration proposal are controlled or 
restricted discretionary activities.153 
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1 Lack of Public Participation 
Public participation in environmental regulation worldwide has been described as “the 
rule rather than the exception”154 This holds true in New Zealand with public 
participation described as a founding principle of the RMA.155 The purposes of the public 
participation process were stressed in Discount Brands Ltd v Westfield (New Zealand) 
Ltd:156 
The purposes of [the] public participatory processes [in the RMA] are twofold – 
first, to recognise and protect as appropriate the particular rights and interests of 
those affected and more general public interests and, secondly, to enhance the 
quality of the decision making. 
While complex due to scientific and technical elements, decisions about the use of natural 
resources and the effects of these activities on the local environment have broader 
cultural and social facets.157 This explains why decisions about whether to notify resource 
consent applications are so controversial.  
 
A council must consider whether an application for a resource consent should be notified. 
There are two types of notified resource consent applications – publically notified and 
limited notified.158 A consent authority must, within 20 working days of receiving an 
application of a resource consent, decide whether to give public or limited notification of 
the application.159 If an application is publicly notified, any member of the public may 
make submissions or ask to be heard at a public hearing.160 If an application is “limited 
notified” then notice of the application is served on persons identified as being adversely 
affected and only those persons may lodge a submission.161 In relation to fracking, if a 
council considers the environmental impacts of the proposed activity are “more than 
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156 Discount Brands Ltd v Westfield (New Zealand) Ltd [2005] NZSC 17, [2005] 2 NZLR 597 at [46]. 
157 Bennett and Colón-Ríos, above n 154, at 6.3.3. 
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minor” it must publically notify the application.162 A rule or National Environmental 
Standard, discussed later, can also require public notification of an application.163  
 
All consent activities must be treated and assessed in the same way. Therefore a council 
cannot be more vigilant during its effects assessment for fracking activities than it is for 
any other activity.164 If there is no apparent evidence of adverse effects, then the council 
may not be able to publically notify the application, despite public desire. A high level of 
public interest does not necessarily meet the alternative notification threshold of “special 
circumstances” existing.  
 
“Special circumstances” have been defined by the Court of Appeal as those that are 
unusual or exceptional, but they may be less than extraordinary or unique.165 In Murray v 
Whakatane District Council, Elias J stated that circumstances which are “special” will be 
those which make notification desirable, notwithstanding the general provisions 
excluding the need for notification.166 Exploratory wells are now being drilled in the East 
Coast Basin – both in Manawatu and in Gisborne. The PCE believes these wells have the 
potential to be the beginning of a rapidly growing industry in this area of the country. On 
its face, it seems arguable that these new exploratory wells present “special 
circumstances.” Nevertheless, neither of the Horizons Regional Council nor Gisborne 
District Council publically notified the consent applications for drilling these exploratory 
wells.167 
 
The Supreme Court has recognised the gravity of the decision around notification. Elias J 
stated that processing consent applications on a non-notified basis “deprives others of the 
right to participate in the determination of the resource consent application” by removing 
the ability to make a submission.168 In Taranaki, there were 20 resource consents for 
fracking issued between 2011 and 2013 and none were publically notified.169 This means 
that the public cannot appeal any consent that is granted because standing is triggered by 
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an original submission.170 Judicial review is the only remedy to appeal the non-
notification decision.171 
 
The lack of public participation can also be analysed from a social issues angle. The 
Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia has stated “community 
confidence about the effective management of environmental impacts and risks 
associated with this industry is best achieved through open and transparent regulatory 
processes”.172 It has been noted that fracking has struggled to gain a “social license” in 
New Zealand.173 The Chief Economist of the International Energy Agency has warned 
that “if this new industry is to prosper, it needs to earn and maintain its social license to 
operate”.174 The term “social license to operate” refers to a local community’s acceptance 
or approval of a project.  
 
The International Energy Agency pointed out that “the environmental and social hazards 
relating to fracking and other features of unconventional gas development have generated 
keen public anxiety in many places”.175 This has led to the lack of a social license to 
operate in the communities where fracking operations occur. While a social license to 
operate is not required to legally operate, failing to acquire social acceptance is likely to 
lead to ongoing conflict.176 Changes in the scope of public engagement could help. 
Bowen argues that without opportunities for active participation and empowerment, 
communities are less likely to issue their approval and support.177 Although increasing 
the level of publically notified resource consent applications may slow decision-making, 
and therefore slow fracking operators, public participation serves the rationale of 
producing “socially acceptable environmental results”.178  
  
170 Carruthers and Pilkinton, above n 155, at 19.  
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2 Unbundling of Consents 
Another issue with the consenting process is the staged application approach. This 
describes the situation where a company will apply for various consents for one well 
separately – i.e. ‘unbundling’ the consents. For example, the exploratory Punawai-1 well 
in Gisborne used a sequential consenting process.179  
 
Under s 91 of the RMA, councils have a ‘discretionary’ deferral power. This allows a 
council to require a company to ‘bundle’ consent applications so that a whole operation 
can be assessed at the same point in time. The council can defer any given application, 
with the test being whether deferral would lead to a better overall understanding of all the 
activities of the proposal as a whole, and the effects of those activities.180 If the council 
understands the consent application before it, that test might not be met.181  
 
The RMA Quality Planning Resource recommends bundling of consents as good practice 
for these types of operations because:182 
Where more than one activity is involved and those activities are inextricably linked, 
the general rule is that the activities should be bundled and the most restrictive 
activity classification applied to the overall proposal. Splitting the proposal into its 
separate applications for the purposes of notification and assessment of effects could 
mean that the council failed to look at a proposal in whole.  
Fracking provides a prime example of how the consenting process can be used in a way 
that prevents councils from assessing the proposal as a whole. Where resource consents 
(e.g. for discharge, land-use and water take) are granted separately, an unbundled 
procedure fails to consider the cumulative effects of the proposal as a whole, and the 
overall impacts on the environment and local communities. It also may lead to the 
decision that an individual consent does not meet the threshold for public notification, 
resulting in reduced public participation as discussed above.  
3 Lack of Power to Prevent Fracking  
Because the consenting of fracking operations lies with regional councils, territorial 
authorities are unlikely to have a direct role in regulation.183 Therefore, even if a 
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territorial authority wished to declare their area as a frack-free zone this is unlikely to 
have any legal effect on the ability of an operator to seek consents or carry out the 
activity. As already laid out, a regional council has a legal duty to process resource 
consent applications according to the statutory timeframes unless there is a prohibited 
activity status.184 Imposing a prohibited activity status would be the way, under the 
current regulatory framework, for a council to implement a ban that would have the force 
of law.185 Alternatively, a National Environmental Standard may prohibit an activity, but 
this would have to occur through central government leadership.186 Arguments for greater 
central government guidance are presented later in the paper.  
 
Before a regional council is able to impose prohibited activity status, the council would 
need to be able to show that prohibited activity status is the most appropriate way to 
achieve the objectives of the regional plan, and ultimately, the purpose of the RMA.187 
Environmental lawyers have speculated that to meet this test the council would need to 
have robust evidence of a “significant risk of adverse effects on the environment if the 
activity is allowed to proceed”.188 Mere perceptions of risk which are not well-founded 
will not suffice.189 These issues can be linked to the discussion of the precautionary 
principle earlier. As outlined, individual consenting decisions leave scope for the decision 
maker to consider a spectrum of risks, including any potential effects of low probability 
which have a high potential impact.190 The imposition of a prohibited activity status 
requires meeting a higher evidential threshold of effects. This is understandable because 
if fracking was to be declared a “prohibited activity”, operators would not be able to 
apply for, and a council would not be able to grant, a resource consent.191 Generally 
speaking, the ability to classify an activity as prohibited should not be used liberally as a 
planning tool to deter activities or development.192 Prohibited activity status should be 
limited to situations of significant risk to health, safety or land use.193  
                                                                                                                                                 
183 Territorial authorities are the second tier of local government including city and district councils. 
184 Ministry for the Environment “Resource consent process for notified/limited notified applications” and 
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This could prove to be an issue as limited New Zealand based studies have been carried 
out. Councils would be reliant on expert evidence provided to them. For example, a GNS 
report in 2012 found no evidence for fracking having an observable effect on natural 
earthquakes in the region.194 There is overseas evidence that could be relevant such as the 
April 2015 United States Geological Survey report confirming induced seismicity as a 
result of underground injection wells.195 However, different regions have different 
physical characteristics that lead to different risk factors. As the environmental impacts of 
fracking are largely dependent on the local environment this overseas evidence may hold 
less weight. The Hawke’s Bay has been highlighted as the next area for fracking.196 
Being a region with major known earthquake faults may mean that wells are more 
vulnerable to damage from seismic activity. 
 
Alternatively, councils could base their argument for prohibited activity status on the lack 
of reassuring evidence.197 Section 32(4)(c) of the RMA allows a council to consider “the 
risk of acting or not acting if there is uncertain or insufficient information about the 
subject matter of the provisions.” This is a recognition of the precautionary principle. The 
Court of Appeal in Coromandel Watchdog identified categories of situations that could 
lead to a prohibited status being imposed. The categories included taking a precautionary 
approach if there is insufficient information about an activity to determine what provision 
should be made for that activity in the local authority’s plan.198 
 
Similar issues concerning the local authorities’ lack of power are currently occurring in 
the United Kingdom. Very recently, the UK Energy Secretary revealed ministers will 
have new powers to “call in” an application for shale gas exploration as soon as it is 
submitted to a local authority.199 Critics argue that this removes local communities from 
the heart of the decision-making process and allows the government to “push their agenda 
of a shale gas revolution” and prioritise the interests of developers.200 
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If the justification for decentralised decision-making in the RMA is to allow those closest 
to the effects to regulate the activities, then this should be comprehensive power to allow 
local communities to decide to prevent fracking in their region or territory. Potential for a 
moratorium is discussed further later in the paper.201 
 
B Problems with Remedies 
Widespread intergenerational environmental risk leads to considerable complexities for 
policy makers. As the extent of the potential effects are unknown and will plague future 
generations, Ogus argues it is harder to correct the externality through private instruments 
as there will be a “time lag in the private rights accruing”.202 Additionally, pinning fault 
for harmful effects specifically on fracking operators is hard to do as fracking occurs 
hundreds of meters below ground where “verification is costly if not impossible”.203  
1 Enforcement under the RMA 
The RMA provides a number of enforcement mechanisms which are designed to ensure 
compliance with the legislative regime.204 Section 338 sets out offences against the 
RMA.  
The most serious offences are set out in s 338(1)-(1B) and include breaches of obligations 
imposed under Part 3 of the RMA. Most relevantly in the fracking context is the breach 
of duties relating to water, other water bodies and discharge of contaminants.205 The most 
serious offences can attract imprisonment of up to two years and fines of up to 
$300,000.206 Section 339(1)(b) states that the maximum fine for a body corporate is 
$600,000. 
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While these offences are not strict liability in the traditional sense,207 it is generally 
unnecessary to prove an intent to commit the offence.208 A relevant comparator case is 
McKnight v New Zealand Biogas Industries Ltd where there was no evidence that the 
defendant was aware of the facts giving rise to the discharge of waste.209 Gault J held that 
“it is difficult…to see room for any mental element in the act of discharge”.210 This 
reiterates that if a fracking operator was to discharge waste in a manner inconsistent with 
consent under the RMA, they would be strictly liable.  
 
Members of the public can apply for an abatement notice under ss 322-325 of the RMA. 
These are issued by local authority enforcement officers and could be used as an option to 
solve a nuisance problem suffered by a person affected by hydraulic fracturing.211 
 
This paper has only offered two examples of enforcement options under the RMA but 
there are a raft of techniques in the statute designed to enforce compliance and deal with 
environmental damage. However, these provisions are not an ideal fit for the type of 
offences they act to punish. With corporate defendants, there is always the risk that the 
company will wind up and depart offshore and a guilty party will not be able to be found. 
Fines may be insufficient to outweigh the cost of restoring harmed sites. In relation to 
fracking operations a fine will likely be an inadequate remedy as serious harms (such as 
contaminated drinking water) are often irreversible. 
2 Common Law 
Section 23(1) of the RMA states that “compliance with this Act does not remove the need 
to comply with all other applicable Acts, regulations, bylaws, and rules of law.” A 
granted resource consent and ownership of a mining permit will not create an exemption 
from tortious liability.212 This has been confirmed by New Zealand courts.213 There is 
potential for common law remedies to provide relief for any potential economic harm 
caused by fracking.  
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the viability of common law claims in depth. 
An example of a common law remedy against fracking operators could be a claim in 
nuisance. In general terms, nuisance is an “unreasonable interference with a person’s 
right to the use or enjoyment of an interest in land”.214 While private nuisance involves 
an invasion of the right to use and enjoy land, public nuisance must:215 
…seriously interfere with the health, convenience, or comfort of the public 
generally, and must, therefore, actually affect a not inconsiderable number of people, 
or interfere with rights which members of the community generally might otherwise 
enjoy. 
Given that the rights of the general public would be seriously harmed if hydraulic 
fracking causes groundwater aquifers to be polluted or contaminated, there may be scope 
for a public nuisance claim in the context of fracking operations.  
 
In terms of private nuisance, the House of Lords in Cambridge Water held that the right 
of a landowner to extract clean ground water beneath their land is a natural right of 
ownership.216 This decision was followed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Autex 
Industries.217 Therefore it is likely that New Zealanders who suffer groundwater 
contamination from fracking activities could rely on the New Zealand courts to follow the 
Cambridge Water approach to interference with their right to clean ground water.218 
 
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher could also be used to found a claim against fracking 
operators. A summation of the rule is:219 
the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, 
and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it 
at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage 
which is the natural consequence of its escape. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has recognised that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is a 
special form of private nuisance.220 As it is a tort, foreseeability of harm must be 
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proven.221 Matheson v Northcote Board of Governors stated that liability under Rylands v 
Fletcher would arise if:222 
(a) A thing which is dangerous per se escapes, causing damage; or 
(b) There is a non-natural use of land, as a result of which damage is caused by the 
escape of a thing which, although not dangerous in itself, proves to be dangerous 
in all the circumstances 
It is therefore arguable that any claims relating potential harms caused by fracking could 
use the Rylands v Fletcher rule as the process involves inherently dangerous 
contaminants (e.g. toxic chemicals in fracking fluids) and the escape of gas could cause 
damage.223  
 
Anticipatory nuisance has been floated by US academics as another possible cause of 
action.224 Tort law generally requires injury or damage before an action for damages or 
injunction relief can be asserted.225 Support for this position is found in the principle that 
it is unfair to assume that a defendant will conduct its activities in a way that will create 
injury.226 This is a less than desirable barrier to claiming relief as environmental damage 
should be avoided as far as possible. The common law doctrine of anticipatory nuisance 
enables courts to “prevent permanent harm in circumstances where it may be difficult or 
even impossible to restore the damage”.227 It is unclear whether this doctrine would find 
favour in New Zealand courts.  
 
In any case, the common law is not a desirable fallback for remedying adverse 
environmental effects. High legal costs are often a bar against a potential plaintiff 
bringing an action. Costs in bringing a claim will involve both the costs of legal 
representation but also likely the costs of hiring an expert witness to provide evidence of 
environmental harm.228 There is also the risk of being ordered to pay the defendant’s 
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costs if the claim is not successful. These costs and the risks of an unsuccessful outcome 
may mean that potential plaintiffs will be deterred from bringing a claim at common law.  
 
Although these issues are common to all litigation, Gearty notes that these difficulties are 
especially relevant to cases involving environmental damage as “often a big business 
concerned is the defendant and the alleged pollution may be the result of a complicated 
scientific process”.229 Civil remedies are often inappropriate for resolving contamination 
and environmental disputes due to the problems of causation and burden of proof. 
Remedies usually focus on returning the plaintiff to the position they would have been in 
if there was no damage and this fails to recognise the intrinsic value of natural 
resources.230 Time limits on common law claims may also be an issue. Where 
contamination results from deep underground activities a plaintiff may be unaware at the 
time the contamination occurs or be unaware of the extent of the damage.  
 
3 Environmental Bonds/Public Liability Insurance 
An interesting issue that could raise regulatory implications is liability for ongoing 
environmental impacts from well leaks or closure. For example, a council may require 
liability insurance or a bond to be paid. In America, Pennsylvania Act 13 requires owners 
and operators to file with the department a bond covering the well and well site.231 
 
Currently, there is no requisite level of public liability insurance for companies operating 
wells.232 Section 108A(2)(d) of the RMA allows councils to require companies to pay a 
bond as a condition to granting a resource consent to “secure performance of conditions 
of the consent including conditions relating to any adverse effects on the environment 
that become apparent during or after the expiry of the consent.” The PCE assessed that 
councils do not appear to have used this provision in relation to oil and gas activities but 
points to the example of Waikato District Council requiring a $100,000 bond from the 
consent holder in relation to a landfill works consent.233 
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Different issues arise when there is a leak from an abandoned well because once a 
consent is surrendered, the landowner will be liable for any future problems.234 This 
paper presents an option of implementing the insurance requirement at the permit stage. 
For offshore drilling installations the Maritime Transport Act 1994 requires each operator 
have a valid certificate of insurance that is accepted by the Director of Maritime 
Safety.235 The relevant rules require the owners of regulated offshore installations to hold 
insurance cover for approximately $27 million to cover any claims for pollution damage 
arising from any spill of harmful substances.236 A similar insurance requirement could be 
implemented for those applying for a permit to frack. If fracking operations, as 
speculated, migrate into the offshore environment any discharge of fracking fluid into the 
sea from an installation will be regulated under the Maritime Transport Act 1994 through 
a discharge management plan and an insurance certification will be required.237 It would 
therefore make sense to have an equivalent insurance against onshore contamination.  
 
 
VII Options for Reform 
Implementation of the regulation reveals a key regulatory policy question: is it 
appropriate for local government to deal with fracking operations as it does conventional 
oil drilling projects or should the responsibility be moved or shared such as it has been 
with offshore drilling? 
A Central Government Guidance 
Decentralised decision-making is central to the operation of the RMA. This devolution of 
authority from a higher to a lower level of government is based on the premise that local 
decision makers are best placed to make the decisions that affect their communities the 
most.238 Law and economics scholars commonly advocate for regulation to occur at the 
level of government that is closest to the problem and subsumes all or most of the costs 
and benefits of the activity to be regulated.239 The PCE expressed concern at a perceived 
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disconnect between central and local government; government receives the financial 
return from the production of oil and gas but the responsibility of regulating the 
production lies on regional and district councils.240 
 
Central government has a role in setting policy on matters of national significance and 
monitoring the implementation of the RMA. Although there is a role for central 
government within the RMA framework, in practice most decisions occur at the level of 
regional and territorial government. When the RMA was enacted, it was originally 
intended that central government would play a strong support role for local government 
regulating consents, for example through National Policy Statements and National 
Environmental Standards.241 However, the government has not played an active role in 
this respect both generally and with regards to fracking. There have been a limited 
number of National Policy Statements with only four in place.242 Difficulties with the 
implementation of these instruments is discussed later. 
 
The MFE can provide central government assistance through either the provision of 
“RMA instruments”243 or through guidance. To date, the Ministry has released guidelines 
in March 2014, titled Managing Environmental Effects of Onshore Petroleum 
Development Activities (Including Hydraulic Fracturing): Guidelines for Local 
Government. However, these guidelines are not enforceable. For example, the waste 
produced by fracking has controversially been disposed of on farmland in Taranaki after 
consent was approved by the council.244 Although the new guidelines do not support the 
practice, MFE is allowing councils to “decide whether or not to follow best practice” and 
then offer deep-well injection as an alternative.245 As discussed earlier, deep-well 
injection comes with its own set of undesirable environmental impacts including an 
increased risk of seismic activity and aquifer contamination.  
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The MFE guidelines state “these guidelines have been prepared by Rhys Armstrong and 
Sabrina Young of GHD Ltd.” Upon a closer look, the GHD Ltd 2013 Annual Report 
states that the company: 
expanded our capabilities in energy and resources with two mergers: Hill Michael 
Engineering in the power sector and ProMet Engineers in the mining sector. This, 
alongside our momentum in oil and gas, has facilitated engagements in major 
projects in Australia, Chile and the Philippines. 
It is concerning that these guidelines, held out as a model of best practice for the industry, 
were prepared by a company with significant interests in the sector. This paper argues 
that guidance should be given from central government in the form of an RMA 
instrument which has strong procedural requirements including scope for public 
submissions. This type of guidance is preferable to guidelines that have been prepared by 
a self-interested party which raises concerns of regulatory capture. RMA instruments can 
impose particular policy choices of central government so that local authority decision 
makers no longer approach decisions under the general policy framework of the Act.246 
These instruments must be given effect by regional councils and district councils and by a 
board of inquiry if a proposal is called in.247 
1 National Policy Statement 
One of the recommendations coming out of the PCE review process, called for the 
Minister for the Environment to direct MFE to prepare a National Policy Statement on 
onshore oil and gas exploration and production.248 Preparing a National Policy Statement 
is discretionary and made on the recommendation of the Minister for the Environment.249  
 
The purpose of National Policy Statements is “to state objectives and policies for matters 
of national significance”.250 National Policy Statements are an instrument for central 
government to use to retain control over the management of resources by guiding local 
government in a high-level policy framework.251 The New Zealand Treasury states that 
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National Policy Statements “give central government the opportunity to elaborate on the 
legislative text, by providing policy direction and guidance”.252 
 
The PCE believes that a National Policy Statement could “give clear direction to both 
regional and district councils on how they should deal with the on shore oil and gas 
industry in their policy statements and plans, focusing on areas where industry expansion 
is likely.” A National Policy Statement requires only one decision-making process as to 
how fracking should be classified and regulated, so a National Policy Statement saves on 
costs of decision-making by cutting out duplication.253  
 
National Policy Statements guide subsequent decision-making under the RMA at the 
national, regional and district levels and can therefore significantly affect resource 
management practices in New Zealand.254 Local authorities must amend, as soon as 
practicable, all relevant documents to give effect to a National Policy Statement once 
promulgated.255 This includes proposed or existing regional policy statements, or 
proposed or existing regional or district plan.256 At present, it is particularly concerning 
that most regional plans do not distinguish between the drilling of an oil and gas well and 
the drilling of a water well.257 This is something that could be implemented in the 
National Policy Statement. A National Policy Statement can also direct local authorities 
as to what is required for planning responses.258 For example the New Zealand Coastal 
Policy Statement requires a “precautionary approach” to be applied in certain 
circumstances.259 This would go beyond the inherent approach to the precautionary 
principle in the RMA and require decision makers to explicitly take a precautionary view. 
 
The RMA does not prescribe the content of National Policy Statements. Section 46B 
provides that they may by reference incorporate standards, requirements or recommended 
  
252 Kevin Guerin Central government guidance and the Resource Management Act (New Zealand Treasury, 
Policy Perspectives Paper 05/02, March 2005) at 4. 
253 Suzi Kerr, Megan Claridge and Dominic Milicich Devolution and the New Zealand Resource 
Management Act (New Zealand Treasury, Treasury Working Paper 98/7, 1998) at 22. 
254 Environment Foundation “Planning Documents and Processes: National Policy Statements” (2014) 
Environment Guide <www.environmentguide.org.nz>.  
255 Resource Management Act, s 55. 
256 Section 55(1). 
257 Wright, above n 14, at 35. 
258 Philip Milne “When is Enough, Enough? Dealing with Cumulative Effects under the Resource 
Management Act” (February 2008) Horizons Regional Council <www.horizons.govt.nz> at 26. 
259 New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010, Policy 3. 
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practices of national or international organisations and other countries or jurisdictions and 
any other written material that deals with technical matters and is too large or impractical 
to include in the standard.  
 
It should be recognised that National Policy Statements are not without their own 
inherent limitations. The process of making a National Policy Statement can be described 
as slow and cumbersome.260 This is largely because time is allowed for many interests 
groups and the public to submit. Lack of public participation in the current consenting 
framework has been highlighted as a major problem with the status quo, so allowing 
community groups and interested parties to submit on a National Policy Statement is 
desirable despite the extra time and potential expense involved. With an electoral term of 
three years, any government commencing the National Policy Statement process would 
need to be confident of more than one term in power or cross-party support as it is likely 
that the creation process would take more than one parliamentary term.261  
2 National Environmental Standard 
The other relevant instrument that could be issued by central government is a National 
Environmental Standard. Section 43 of the RMA makes provision for National 
Environmental Standards to be established through regulations. These standards give 
central government an opportunity to promote the adoption of consistent standards at 
regional and district levels as a National Environmental Standard applies nationally and 
overrides regional rules.  
 
The regulations may prohibit an activity, or allow an activity subject to compliance with 
rules.262 This will achieve nationwide consistency as regional and local councils will have 
to enforce the same standard. Consistency is also in the interests of industry, as they will 
have familiarity in regulatory processes if operating in one or more regions. National 
Environmental Standards may act as a minimum baseline and allow councils to impose 
stricter standards in their own plans or it may be absolute so that local rules cannot be 
more lenient or stricter than the standard.263 
 
  
260 David Young Values as Law: The History and Efficacy of the Resource Management Act (Institute of 
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Currently, the “National Environmental Standard for Assessing and Managing 
Contaminants in Soil to Protect Human Health” applies to fracking operators where a 
well has contaminated soil at a site that is to be converted to a different use.264 A 
suggestion for creating another relevant National Environmental Standard is surrounding 
the issue of wastewater. As outlined earlier in this paper, the disposal of wastewater is 
concerning and largely unregulated. Keene argues that the best options is a legally-
binding standard requiring full treatment of wastewater before disposal:265 
This could be promulgated as a National Environmental Standard under s 43 of the 
RMA. This would put constraints on consenting authorities when considering 
consents for fracking, while retaining their ability to reject or put further conditions 
on the activity of fracking overall. Making the industry responsible for the full 
environmental impacts of its activities would create economic incentives for 
innovation.  
The United States left disposal of wastewater unregulated at a national level and allowed 
a state-by-state regulation of wastewater disposal.266 This resulted in widely varying 
standards. Although Pennsylvania has a strong regulation requiring private treatment of 
wastewater, 267 other states do not have these standards so polluted waste can be exported. 
This presents a strong argument for central government regulation so that operators 
cannot exploit weaker regulatory regimes in neighbouring regions. National 
Environmental Standards would be useful for specific aspects of the fracking process 
such as waste disposal where clear technical standards for the whole country can be set. 
 
B Centralised Body 
The industry is against a central agency controlling fracking consents. Large player Todd 
Energy argued in a submission that “local consenting is more flexible and responsive to 
local conditions than ‘command and control' from the centre, which would inevitably be 
more prescriptive”.268 However, as outlined earlier in the paper the current piecemeal 
regulation is inadequate and leading to wide variation in regulation across regions. 
Another option for reform is that the EPA could be given responsibility for managing 
  
264 Resource Management (National Environmental Standard for Assessing and Managing Contaminants in 
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consents for any extraction projects involving fracking. There are already processes in 
place within the agency due to their experience with managing consenting for activities in 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and managing the decision-making process for 
proposals of national significance under the RMA.  
 
The EPA is a Crown agent under the Crown Entities Act 2004.269 The key reason for 
establishing the EPA was to provide greater central government direction in 
environmental regulation and address weaknesses in the environmental management 
framework.270 The EPA has a range of functions under various environmental legislation 
and regulations.271 For example, the EPA is responsible for fracking fluids under the 
HSNO legislation and it would be desirable to incorporate more of the fragmented 
process under one regulatory body. This paper has discussed the issue of councils relying 
on HSNO Act approvals without further assessment. The EPA is better placed and 
informed on hazardous substances to deal with these approvals in the context of the wider 
consenting process.  
 
In particular, the EPA has experience with managing the environmental effects of 
activities such as petroleum exploration and mining in the EEZ. Prior to the EEZ Act, 
activities in these areas were unregulated. The activities managed include the 
construction of petroleum platforms, seabed mining, possible aquaculture developments, 
carbon capture and storage and marine farming.272 The RMA only extends to New 
Zealand’s territorial sea, out to 12 nautical miles, and therefore legislation was needed to 
fill a gap in our environmental law. 
 
The public debate around the exploration of our EEZ, much like fracking, involves the 
same fundamental tension between economic opportunities and environmental protection. 
Due to the EEZ’s largely unknown qualities, it is a significant zone of untapped space 
and resources that mining investors are looking to for future developments.273 There is 
overlap on the issues of public resistance and the struggle for a social license to 
operate.274 Introduction of the legislation followed the “Deepwater Horizon” incident in 
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the Gulf of Mexico, and more recent protests regarding the entrance of international 
mining companies to the New Zealand off-shore mining scene. 
 
Changes to the initial legislation, triggered by public submissions, have seen a final EEZ 
Act that is aligned much more closely with the RMA than was originally intended. 
Industry see this as a “backwards step” due to the widespread dismay at the slow and 
cumbersome nature of the RMA when attempting development.275 However, this close 
alignment would make the transfer of consenting responsibilities less difficult. The EEZ 
Act has two pathways for marine consent applications, notified and non-notified. Seabed 
mining is classified as a publicly notified activity and therefore the views of the public 
and people with existing interests are taken into account during the application process.276 
Fracking could also be classified in this way to allow for greater public participation.  
 
Energy companies are beginning to employ controversial fracking operations in deep 
waters off the United States, South American and African coasts.277 It has not been used 
in New Zealand’s offshore environment to date but it were proposed it would be 
considered under the EEZ regime.278 This supports that the EPA could play a role in 
consenting for hydraulic fracturing operations onshore, as it may well take on this 
responsibility in the offshore environment soon. 
C Moratorium 
The third option presented is for the declaration of a moratorium on all fracking activities. 
There have been calls from local government for the government to call a moratorium on 
fracking. As at 2012, Waimakariri District Council, Kaikoura District Council, 
Christchurch City Council and Selwyn District Council had called for an urgent 
moratorium. A moratorium is a temporary suspension until future events warrant a 
removal of the suspension or issues regarding the activity have been resolved. In April 
2012, the Christchurch City Council voted unanimously to declare the city a “fracking-
free zone”.279 Under present law, this is largely a symbolic gesture. As discussed earlier, 
any resource consent applications for fracking must be lodged with Environment 
Canterbury as the regional council has jurisdiction over consenting underground 
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discharges. Christchurch City Council has stated they would lodge an objection to any 
applications and consider appealing any decision to grant permits for fracking.280  
 
It would not be a world first to declare a moratorium on fracking. The most notable 
moratorium to be declared is in the state of New York. Perhaps more than anywhere else, 
fracking has helped to “revolutionise” the domestic oil and gas supply outlook in the 
United States.281 The industry has been transformed as a result of fracking, so that the 
output from hydraulically-fractured wells now makes up 43 percent of the oil production 
and 67 percent of the country’s natural gas production. Current regulatory debate in the 
US about hydraulic fracturing has focused on the merits of federal versus state 
regulation.282 In December 2014, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced an 
open-ended prohibition of fracking. New York sits above the Marcellus Shale Formation 
which also underlies parts of Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia and parts of Maryland 
and Virginia. Geologists believe that the Marcellus could hold up to 500 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas, making it potentially the second largest natural gas field worldwide.283 
 
The economic potential of fracking activities is undeniable. A report prepared by Venture 
Taranaki, Taranaki’s regional development agency, suggests that:284 
When compared to the impacts of a moratorium, a business as usual scenario – 
maintaining the current level of the practice – will result in an additional 773PJ of 
gas, 277PJ of oil, and return $10.5 billion in revenue, $5.1 billion in exports and $1 
billion - $1.6 billion in royalties to the Government over the next decade. 
If fracking is to expand at the rate predicted, this figure would be much higher:285 
If a growth model is permitted, compared to a moratorium hydraulic fracturing could 
contribute $29.4 billion in revenue, $23.7 billion in exports and up to $4.4 billion in 
royalties over the next decade. Further, this scenario could deliver $799 million in 
total GDP and an average of 7,386 jobs annually. 
However, these cost assessments assume that there are no detriments to allowing 
fracking operations to go ahead. An assessment of the potential environmental 
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damages should be balanced against the economic benefits. There has been no such 
assessment in New Zealand. A report by Environment America concluded that long 
term the public will be exposed to many different costs as a result of fracking 
including potentially millions of dollars of expenditure to combat air pollution and 
drinking water contamination.286 Furthermore, the delayed appearance of harm and 
diffuse regional impacts result in the public bearing these costs and industry players 
remaining unaccountable.287 There are limitations of using cost-benefit analysis in 
decisions such as whether to impose a moratorium. This is because cost-benefit 
studies often focus on quantified benefits of the proposed action as many benefits 
of preventing environmental harm cannot be quantified.288 
 
In both investigations, the PCE refused to conclude that a moratorium was 
necessary. The oil and gas industry makes a large contribution to the New Zealand 
economy – as at 2012 oil was New Zealand’s fourth largest export and the industry 
contributes almost $3 billion to GDP.289 The current government has expressed that 
the strategic direction of the economy involves further exploitation of our natural 
resources. Fracking advocates point to over 20 years of fracking in the Taranaki 
region without incident and it is unclear how a moratorium would affect operations 
in that region. However, political will could change. Declaration of a moratorium is 
the strongest action possible, and can be described as the embodiment of the 
precautionary principle in its strongest form.  
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VIII Conclusion 
International experience shows that a fracking boom can spread very quickly across a 
country and regulators are often left scrambling to catch up. This paper has outlined the 
current regulatory framework in New Zealand. Regulation is spread over a number of 
statutes and a number of regulatory agencies which results in a fragmented and confusing 
regime. Local authorities are left with the responsibility of consenting despite complex 
environmental issues being at play. There is no consistency in regional plans and rules 
about how fracking operations should be managed which leads to different treatments in 
different areas. Areas of particular concern have been outlined such as the need to bundle 
consents, where operators apply for resource consents for a project separately. This 
makes it hard for the total effects of a project to be assessed at the consenting stage. 
 
This paper outlined, and drew on, the work of the PCE who has conducted two 
investigations into hydraulic fracturing in New Zealand. These reports did not advocate 
for a moratorium but did emphasise concerns about the state of current regulation. The 
PCE urged the government to “get ahead of the game” and implement central government 
guidance for the management of onshore unconventional oil and gas development. The 
Government’s response has been described as “polite rather than enthusiastic”.290 Despite 
stating that the recommendations will be considered, no timeframe has been given and 
there has been no movement on implementing policy from a central government level. 
 
This paper explored the precautionary principle and how a precautionary attitude could 
be adopted when considering consenting fracking operations. It concludes that while 
there is scope within the RMA to take into account the precautionary principle, it would 
be more desirable for decision makers to be obliged to “favour caution and protection of 
the environment” as required in the marine consenting process under the information 
principles in the EEZ Act. 
 
The RMA is designed to facilitate community participation in decisions about the 
sustainable management of natural resources. Fracking has grown as an issue in the 
public consciousness, particularly in the last five years, and members of the public feel 
strongly engaged with the issue. This paper highlighted the problems with curtailing 
public participation through processing consents on a non-notified basis. Public 
submissions can bring a wider range of viewpoints to the resource management 
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discussion and industry efforts to engage with local communities can help operators to 
earn a social license to operate.  
 
This paper assessed the RMA from a risk regulation perspective and found that the 
framework for regulating risk is in place but implementation is currently exacerbating 
risks due to a lack of local government power. Options for reform have been presented. 
Central government guidance is urged, either in the form of a National Policy Statement 
or National Environmental Standard. The RMA consenting process is inherently limited 
by the requirement that all consent applications are assessed in the same manner and to 
the same degree. Nationalised standards should be implemented before further fracking 
consents are evaluated. This would solve problems in the current regime. A consistent 
national regulatory framework provides clarity and consistency for both local government 
and industry operators. It would also allow central government to require decision makers 
to apply the precautionary principle to fracking consenting decisions or could impose a 
prohibited activity status. Alternatively, a centralised body (the EPA being the obvious 
candidate) could be given responsibility for managing the consenting process for 
operations that involve fracking. This allows an expert body, with greater knowledge of 
the area to apply this understanding, and evaluate consent proposals.  
 
Reform is needed immediately. Exploration for unconventional oil and gas is expanding 
in New Zealand, particularly in new areas such as the East Coast Basin. The East Coast 
Basin ranges from Gisborne down to the Wairarapa and the shale in this area potentially 
holds “billions of barrels of oil”.291 TAG Oil has claimed that New Zealand is destined to 
become the “Texas of the South.” Fracking has occurred for over 20 years in Taranaki 
without incident but it is vital that the government is not complacent about the need for 
tighter regulation. The degree of environmental harm is greatly dependent on the 
geography of the region, and the East Coast is very geographically different to Taranaki. 
Fracking shale in East Coast Basin could produce very different risks from the fracking 
that has occurred in the tight sands of Taranaki.292 New Zealand needs robust, consistent 
and sector-specific regulation. 
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